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Abstract
This paper analyzes regional public education policy in the presence of mobile workers.
Labor market integration leads to fiscal competition, shifting the whole burden of taxation to
immobile workers. In the case of mobile skilled workers, this results in income inequalities
and inefficient low investment in human capital. This is even more pronounced if politicians
are partly self-interested. In contrast, if unskilled workers are mobile, all households receive
the same net earnings. In this scenario, a benevolent government ensures an efficient level of
human capital investment, while partly selfish politicians choose to invest too little in
education.
JEL Code: H21, H23.
Keywords: education policy, factor mobility.
Ulrich Hange





Education ranks high on the political as well as the economic research agenda.
Education as investment in human skills and capital may help to foster economic
growth, enhance productivity, aﬀect personal and social development, and explain
income and wealth distribution. Especially, in countries that are not endowed with
large reserves of natural resources human capital is the major source of national
wealth and thus of special public concern. Many countries invest a substantial share
of national resources in education, mostly funded by the government.1 The reasons
for this strong public engagement in education are manifold, although human capital
is mainly seen as a private good.2
At the same time, we observe a tendency towards regional and economic integra-
tion during the last decades. The most prominent example is the European Union,
granting free migration of goods, services, capital and labor within its member states.
Enhancing mobility of goods and factors, integration is expected to improve the al-
location of resources. However, this also means increasing mobility of tax bases that
may increase the cost to governments of raising revenue, altering distributive and
allocative consequences of public policies.3
In this paper we present some basic insights with regard to public education po-
licy when workers are perfectly mobile. Building on the inspiring work by Wildasin
(2000b) we extend his model in several respects. First, we analyze not only the case
of mobile skilled workers, but also the scenario of mobile unskilled workers, which is
more feared by the public and politicians.4 Second, while Wildasin (2000b) investi-
gates the optimal policy of a benevolent government, his analysis neglects the fact
1In 1998, all OECD countries as a whole spent 5.7 percent of GDP on educational institutions.
On average across these countries, 89 percent of all funds for educational institutions come from
public sources. C.f. OECD (2001).
2For a comprehensive and intuitive overview from an economic perspective c.f. Stiglitz (2000).
In this paper we do not stress this issue further but take as given that education is provided and
ﬁnanced by the government.
3For a comprehensive overview of this issue c.f. Wellisch (2000) and Wildasin (2000a).
4While empirically the propensity to migrate rises with education, c.f. Greenwood (1997), inter-
national migration towards the European Union is mainly a phenomenon of unskilled labor driven
by huge income diﬀerences and decreasing migration costs, c.f. Sinn (2002) and Wellisch (2002).
1that some bureaucrats in each governments administration have strong incentives to
use some public revenue for their own purposes. According to Niskanen (1971), this
Leviathan–type government seeks to maximize its budget. These sharply diﬀerent
views of government’s behavior reﬂect equally diﬀerent perceptions of government
policy–making. While the ﬁrst optimistically assumes that governments are bene-
volent utility maximizers of their citizens, the Leviathan government is supposed to
be wholly self–interested. Following the studies of Edwards and Keen (1996) and
Hange and Wellisch (1998) we try to reconcile both views by assuming that govern-
ments are neither entirely benevolent nor fully selﬁsh and compare the outcome to
the benevolent governments policy.5
Beside the well–known result that governments competing for mobile factors will
abstain from taxing them, this study presents a number of further basic insights on
optimal education policy in the presence of mobile households. First, if skilled wor-
kers are mobile they will be better oﬀ than unskilled households, because immobile
unskilled workers have to bear all education costs. Thus, government restricts the
access to the public education system. Second, if the government is inequality averse
and skilled households are mobile, public education is ineﬃciently low. This is even
more pronounced when governments are partly selﬁsh.
In contrast, if unskilled workers are mobile all households are equally well oﬀ.
But, while a benevolent government ensures an eﬃcient level of education, partly
self–interested politicians invest too little in human capital. The reason for this is,
that partly–selﬁsh government would like to make skilled workers worse oﬀ than
mobile unskilled households. But this is impossible because no one can be forced to
acquire skill if she will be worse oﬀ. Hence, in order to capture some revenue for
its own purposes, government’s policy has to guarantee that gross income of skilled
workers must exceed that of unskilled households by more than only the costs of
skill acquisition.
To derive these insights the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop
5Andersson and Konrad (2001, 2002) analyze the optimal education policy of Leviathan–type
and benevolent governments facing a time consistency problem. One of their ﬁndings is that the
benevolent government may support private skill acquisition, while the Leviathan government tries
to prevent households from mobility–enhancing education investment.
2the basic model in line of Wildasin (2000b) and analyze as a benchmark case the
optimal education policy in a closed economy. Section 3 presents the optimal go-
vernment’s behavior when skilled workers are perfectly mobile, whereas in section 4
we investigate the case when unskilled labor is perfectly mobile. Finally, section 5
summarizes and gives some concluding remarks.
2 Education Policy in a Closed Economy
Consider an economy consisting of many identical jurisdictions or regions. Each is
populated by N initially identical native households. A household has to decide
whether to acquire additional education and become a skilled worker or to remain
unskilled. After the educational decision is met and education has been completed,
all households are endowed with one unit of labor which is inelastically supplied to
ﬁrms. A skilled worker earns the gross wage wh while an unskilled worker receives
the gross return wl.6 The costs of education are constant and sum up to e for each
skilled worker.
We suppose that households are not able to ﬁnance their investment in human
capital because of legal restraints on the appropriability of human capital and, thus,
education has to be funded by the regional government by taxing working households
residing in the region.7 For this, the government has two taxes at its disposal, a per
capita tax on skilled and unskilled households, th and tl.8 Each household uses the
entire net income to consume private goods ch and cl, respectively. Thus, the private
6In the following, subindex h denotes skilled labor while subindex l marks unskilled labor,
respectively.
7Financing education by taxation is the predominant way at least in all countries of the EU.
One might also assume that the regional government could also charge workers directly for the
cost of acquiring skills. But this assumption would also imply either that households have suﬃcient
nonhuman capital to ﬁnance their own human capital investment before they work or that the
government may eﬀectively circumvent the prohibitions on contracts in which a household pawn
her future earnings in exchange for present resources to ﬁnance her education. In the second case
the government implements or at least supplant a perfect capital market.
8The possibility to tax households according to their skill–level reﬂects – in a very simple way
– a progressive tax system.
3budget constraints are
ci = wi  ti; i = h;l: (1)
All households have identical concave utility functions u(ci), @u(ci)=@ci  u0(ci) > 0,
@2u(ci)=@c2
i  u00(ci)  0, i = h;l, deﬁned over its consumption of private goods as a
skilled worker ch and unskilled worker cl, respectively. The good’s price is normalized
to unity.
Since a household cannot be forced to acquire skills when she or he will be worse
oﬀ by additional education, ch < cl, a household chooses to get educated until
u(ch)  u(cl) , ch  cl (2)
is achieved. A government has to keep this constraint in mind when deciding on its
optimal education policy.
Production of the private consumption good takes place by a linear–homogenous
production function F(Lh;Ll) using skilled labor Lh and unskilled labor Ll. The pro-
duction function fulﬁlls the INADA conditions and is strictly concave with positive
but diminishing marginal productivities in both factors. All markets are perfectly
competitive and all workers are paid according to their marginal products,
@F
@Lh
 Fh = wh;
@F
@Ll
 Fl = wl: (3)
Furthermore, all markets clear. Let Nh denotes the number of native skilled hou-
seholds and Nl the number of native unskilled households, respectively. In a closed
economy the number of skilled and unskilled workers used in production is equal
to the number of skilled and unskilled households, Nh = Lh and Nl = Ll, and all
native households are either skilled or unskilled,
N = Nh + Nl: (4)
Before describing governments decisions, it is instructive to analyze the condition
for optimal investment in human capital maximizing total output. For this, a central
planner would have to maximize total production minus education costs, F(Nh;Nl)
Nhe, subject to the resource constraint Nl = N  Nh by choosing Nh yielding the
ﬁrst–order condition
Fh  e = Fl: (5)
4Thus, production eﬃciency is met if the marginal product of an additional skilled
worker is just high enough to compensate for her or his education costs.9
2.1 Benevolent government’s policy
Since skill acquisition occurs prior to working, government has to pre–ﬁnance human
capital investment for native households. Furthermore, the government decides whe-
ther to restrict the access to the public education system and control the number
of skilled native households Nh. This may be done directly by setting enrollment
contingents at public educational institutions, or indirectly by assigning the level of
critical inputs such as the number of staﬀ employed.10
Of course, the choice of government’s policy hinges crucially on the objective
function guiding government’s decision. First, the choice about the number of skilled
households are made ex ante and the ex ante residents are, by deﬁnition, natives.
Therefore, it makes sense to suppose that expenditure policy should reﬂect the
interests of native population. Second, since all households are initially identical we
assume that a government has no speciﬁc preference for skilled or unskilled native
households when deciding on its policy. Thus, it is reasonable to presume that a
benevolent government maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function11
Nhu(ch) + Nlu(cl) (6)
Public expenditures of a benevolent government consists only of total education
costs Nhe. These expenditures must be ﬁnanced by taxes on working households
9Since we assume in the following that households acquire their skills in their region of birth,
condition (5) also characterizes the eﬃcient investment in human capital in a small open economy
with mobile workers. Note that in this framework condition (5) is also fulﬁlled in a laissez–faire
equilibrium with unrestricted access to education which must be ﬁnanced privately. C.f. Wildasin
(2000b) and Wellisch (2002).
10A further way to restrict the access to public education system exists by setting minimum
admission requirements as, for example, marks of students. But this is not captured by the following
analytical framework, since all households are assumed to be identical initially.
11This assumption may be even more justiﬁed if policy is made under uncertainty from behind a
”veil of ignorance“ as in Wildasin (2000b). Note that the utilitarian welfare function also subsumes
values of society regarding inequality and justice. C.f. Cowell (1995).
5residing in the region. Thus, government’s budget constraint reads as
Lhth + Lltl = Nhe: (7)
After the government has chosen taxes and has decided whether to restrict the access
to the education system, households decide whether they acquire skill, so that the
constraint (2) is always relevant for government’s decision.
The government maximizes (6) subject to the budget constraints (1) and (7),
taking into account (3) and (4), by choosing th, tl, and Nh. Solving the government’s
problem yields12
ch = cl; (8)
th = e; and tl = 0: (9)
Condition (8) reveals that, in a closed economy, a benevolent government does not
restrict the access to skill acquisition and ensure the same utility level for all house-
holds. Furthermore, condition (9) states that the government chooses the tax sche-
dule so that only skilled households have to bear the costs of education. Finally,
using (8), (9), and the private budget constraint (1) together with (3) gives
Fh  e = Fl: (10)
Hence, in a closed economy a benevolent government achieves an eﬃcient level of
human capital investment.13
2.2 Partly selﬁsh government’s policy
Beside the benevolent government approach there exists a sharply diﬀerent view of
government policy–making. Following Niskanen (1971), politicians do not seek to
maximize the welfare of their residents, but to maximize their tax revenues in order
to ﬁnance public expenditure which only beneﬁts themselves.
12For a detailed derivation, see Appendix 1.
13As shown by Wildasin (2000b) and Wellisch (2002), the optimal education policy of a bene-
volent government replicates the outcome in a laissez–faire equilibrium with unrestricted access to
privately ﬁnanced education.
6In this section we partially incorporate this perception of policy–making and
follow the studies of Edwards and Keen (1996) and Hange and Wellisch (1998) sup-
posing that governments are neither entirely benevolent nor fully self–interested. On
the one hand, a government maximizes the welfare of all native residents reﬂecting,
for example, that politicians want to get reelected and hence have to bear their
voters’ utility in mind. On the other hand, politicians ﬁnance public expenditure
Z which beneﬁts solely the policy–makers. From the viewpoint of a representative
household this part of government expenditure is wasted. Thus, we have to rewrite
the government budget constraint as
Lhth + Lltl = Nhe + Z: (11)
We describe politicians’ preferences for Z by the function V (Z) which exhibits posi-
tive but diminishing marginal utility, @V=@Z  V 0(Z) > 0, @2V=@Z2  V 00(Z) < 0.
Now, the government’s objective function reads as14
Nhu(ch) + Nlu(cl) + V (Z): (12)
The partly selﬁsh government’s problem is to maximize (12) subject to (11), by
choosing th, tl, Nh, and Z, and taking into account that ci and Nl are as deﬁned by
(1), (3), and (4).
The ﬁrst order conditions for this problem are:15





th = e +
Z
N




Condition (13) shows that, for a given amount of wasteful expenditures Z, the gover-
nment does not restrict the skill acquisition, ensuring the same consumption possi-
bilities for all households. However, this does not mean that a partly self–interested
government ensures the same consumption level as a benevolent government. As
14Adding V (Z) up to the utilitarian welfare function Nhu(ch)+Nlu(cl) does not only eases the
analysis, but allows for a direct comparison to the purely benevolent government outcome.
15A detailed analysis may be found in Appendix 2.
7long as politicians are partly selﬁsh, they use some resources for their own purposes,
shrinking the consumption possibilities for all residents. Condition (14) describes
how resources are distributed between the selﬁsh policy–makers and the citizens. In
the optimum, marginal beneﬁt of increasing Z must be equal to the marginal costs
given by the decrease of the utility level of a skilled or unskilled household u0(ci),
i = h;l. The optimal tax policy is given by condition (15). As in the case of a bene-
volent government, skilled workers have to bear the whole costs of their education.
Beyond, each household pays the amount of Z=N, ﬁnancing wasteful expenditures.
Inserting the private budget constraints (1) together with (3) in (13) and using
condition (15) yields
Fh  e = Fl: (16)
Thus, a partly selﬁsh government chooses also an eﬃcient level of investment in
human capital guaranteeing the highest amount of resources for the whole economy.
But, since policy makers use some of the resources for their own beneﬁt, consump-
tion levels of native households are lower than in the benevolent government case.
This may be summarized in
Proposition 1: In a closed economy with publicly ﬁnanced education, govern-
ment’s policy ensures an eﬃcient allocation of skill acquisition and equalizes net
incomes of skilled and unskilled households. A benevolent government taxes only
skilled workers who have to bear their costs of education th = e. In addition, a partly
selﬁsh government reduces the consumption of their residents equally by the amount
of Z=N to ﬁnance its wasteful expenditures.
3 Education policy with mobile skilled labor
One of the most universal mobility relationships is that the propensity to migrate
increases with education.16 To capture this scenario, consider the case where all
small jurisdictions are connected by a common market for skilled labor. Therefore,
the number of skilled labor employed in one jurisdiction Lh is not determined by
16Empirical evidence and studies are presented by Greenwood (1997).
8the number of educated native households, Nh. In contrast, unskilled households are
immobile, and the number of unskilled workers is equal to the number of unskilled
native households, Ll = Nl = N  Nh.
As employers do not discriminate against immigrant skilled workers, they earn
the same wage as native skilled workers, wh = Fh. Moreover, we assume that the
government ﬁscally treats immigrants and native skilled households in the same
way.17 Thus, all skilled households within the region receive the same (gross) wage
and have to pay the same tax th.
All skilled households are assumed to be able to migrate at no costs from their
home region to another.18 If a skilled household settles outside the region she or he
attains a (net) income !h, taken as given by all agents. Skilled households will only
reside in their home region if they get at least this reservation income. Hence, the
migration equilibrium is characterized by identical consumption possibilities within
and outside the region for mobile skilled workers,
ch = Fh  th = !h: (17)
Diﬀerentiating (17) with respect to th and taking into account that !h is ﬁxed from





Thus, if the government raises th, skilled households will leave the region until the
reduction in their income dth, is fully oﬀset by an equivalent wage increase dFh.
From the government’s perspective consumption possibilities of skilled households
do not alter with its taxing policy.
17This assumption reﬂects the situation within the European Union. There, Article 48 of the
European Treaty on the EU prohibits a diﬀerent national or regional treatment of citizens coming
from other EU countries with respect to their ﬁscal status.
18This assumption of perfect mobility made for analytical convenience seems to be very strong.
More realistically, migration costs could be included. As long as these costs are not prohibitively
high, they will not qualitatively change, but only weaken the results.
93.1 Benevolent government’s behavior
Integration of labor markets signiﬁcantly changes government’s education policy.
Fearing the ﬂight of the tax bases, governments are forced to cut down their taxes
on mobile factors. Thus, the mobility of skilled households constrains the mix of
taxes a government will choose. As will be shown in this section, the equilibrium
level of education will also be aﬀected.
To analyze this, we follow Wildasin (2000b) and Wellisch (2002) and assume that
households acquire their skills in the home region. Hence, skilled workers coming
from abroad cause no costs to the education system in their host region. In fact, the
education cost has to be borne by the region where they grew up.19
As in the previous section, we assume that the government chooses the optimal
education policy ex ante and therefore maximizes the utilitarian social welfare func-
tion (6) including only the utility of native households.20 Maximizing (6) subject to
the private budget constraints of skilled and unskilled native households, (17) and
(1) together with (3), and the government’s budget constraint (7) by choosing th;tl
and Nh and taking into account that Nl = N  Nh gives the optimal education
policy of a benevolent government as 21




u(ch)  u(cl) = u
0(cl)(tl + e): (20)
Condition (19) replicates the well–known result in the literature on ﬁscal fedearlism
19To saddle emigrating skilled households at least partly with their education cost in the home
country, exit fees in the spirit of a brain drain tax as suggested by Bhagwati (1976) and Bhagwati
and Partington (1976) may be reasonable. Such an exit fee is prohibited within the US as well as
within the EU (c.f. Article 48 of the European Treaty) since this tax would impede free mobility
of labor.
20One may argue that welfare is depending on skilled and unskilled workers residing in the region,
Lhu(ch) + Nlu(cl). This would not change any of the forthcoming results regarding the optimal
tax policy. Since utility of skilled workers is determined by !h and exogenously given from the
government’s point of view, tax policy only aﬀects the utility of unskilled native households. Thus,
in fact, for a given level of investment in human capital Nhe, tax policy is chosen to maximize the
net income of the unskilled workers.
21For a detailed derivation, see Appendix 3.
10that governments abstain from taxing mobile factors if they can impose a tax on
immobile factors.22 Thus, governments competing for mobile skilled workers fully
ﬁnance their education policy by taxes on immobile unskilled workers.23
This result inﬂuences the optimal investment policy in human capital. Since th = 0
and !h is given from the government’s point of view, the marginal productivity of
skilled labor must also be taken as given by the regional government, Fh = !h. Due
to the properties of a linear–homogeneous production function, the gross wage of
unskilled labor is also exogenously given. Hence, if the government levies taxes that
allow its citizens to become skilled and earn !h it has to harm unskilled workers. In
equilibrium, public education policy has to make unskilled households worse oﬀ than
skilled workers in order to increase welfare. Formally, the optimal investment policy
in human capital is described by condition (20). The utility diﬀerence u(ch)  u(cl)
on the left hand side gives the marginal welfare beneﬁt of an additional skilled
native household. But educating one more native household causes two kinds of cost
stated on the right hand side of (20). First, government’s expenditures increase by
the education costs e, and, second, this reduces the number of unskilled taxpaying
natives, each of whom is paying taxes in the amount of tl. Summarizing, the net ﬁscal
marginal costs add to tl + e, which must be borne by unskilled natives. Evaluating
this loss by the marginal utility of an unskilled worker gives the marginal welfare
cost of an additional skilled native household.24
To ensure that the education policy makes skilled households better oﬀ than
unskilled workers, ch > cl, the government has to restrict the access to the publicly
provided education system for natives. Does this policy also lead to an ineﬃcient
level of human capital investment? Following Wildasin (2000b) the answer is yes,
as long as the utility function u(c) is strictly concave, u00(c) < 0, and the utilitarian
welfare function features, thus, some degree of inequality aversion. Intuitively, some
22C.f. Sinn (1997) and Wellisch (2000). Note that this result holds independently on the size of
economies. Thus, the assumption of small open economies, while simplifying the formal analysis,
does not alter the basic insights.
23It is worth to emphasize once again, that this policy is in the interest of the immobile unskilled
workers, too.
24Since the right hand side of (20) is strictly positive for Nh > 0, the utility diﬀerential on the
left hand side must also be positive, formally prooﬁng the above mentioned intuition.
11degree in the eﬃciency of human capital investment is sacriﬁced in order to reduce
the income diﬀerences between skilled and unskilled native households and to achieve
a more equal income distribution.
Formally, this may be seen by using the instrument of Taylor expansions. As we
know from (5), eﬃciency is characterized by Fhe = Fl or Fh = Fl+e, respectively.
Since in the case of perfectly mobile skilled households u(ch) = u(Fh), eﬃciency
would require u(Fh) = u(Fl + e). Approximating u(Fl + e) at Fl  tl yields
u(Fl + e) = u(Fl  tl) + u





00(Fl  tl)[Fl + e  (Fl  tl)]
2 + :::
= u(cl) + u






Comparing this to condition (20) reveals that the equilibrium level of skilled natives
with publicly ﬁnanced human capital and perfectly mobile skilled households must
be less than eﬃciency demands:25
u(ch) = u(Fh) = u(cl) + u
0(cl)(e + tl) > u(Fl + e) ) Fh > Fl + e: (21)
3.2 Partly selﬁsh government’s behavior
Following the procedure as above, a partly self–interested government maximizes
Nhu(ch) + Nlu(cl) + V (Z) subject to the budget constraints (1) together with (3),
(11), and (17) with regard to th, tl, and Nh. Solving this yields the ﬁrst order
conditions26




25As shown by Wildasin (2000b, p. 89), the ineﬃciency hinges crucially on the inequality aversion.
To see this suppose a linear utility function, e.g., u(ci) =  + ci, i = h;l, and, thus, a utilitarian
welfare function which is neutral with regard to inequality. Using this function in (20) reveals that
Fh = Fl + e and education policy ensures an eﬃcient investment in human capital. Of course,
this does not mean that net income of skilled and unskilled households are equal, since unskilled
workers have to ﬁnance public education. But the government restricts the access to the education
system in an eﬃcient way.




u(ch)  u(cl) = u
0(cl)(tl + e): (24)
Condition (22) reveals that, as a benevolent government, partly selﬁsh politicians
abstain from taxing mobile households and that government’s expenditures are fully
ﬁnanced by taxing immobile unskilled workers. A partly self–interested government
uses some resources for its own consumption, Z. According to (23), politicians will
increase Z until the marginal beneﬁt V 0(Z) equals the marginal cost given by the
marginal utility of unskilled households u0(cl), since utility of skilled households are
given from the government’s perspective.
As is shown by condition (24) mimicking (20), partly selﬁsh politicians also re-
strict the access to the publicly ﬁnanced education system and have to make unskil-
led households worse oﬀ than skilled workers. The optimal number of skilled natives
is achieved when marginal beneﬁt of educating one further native is equal to the
marginal costs consisting of additional education costs e and the gone tax payments
tl. Note that for a given number of skilled native households the marginal costs as
well as the marginal beneﬁt are higher than in the benevolent government’s case.
On the one hand an additional gone tax paying unskilled worker ﬁnances not only
the educational system but also government’s consumption Z, increasing the mar-
ginal costs. But since unskilled households have to ﬁnance the whole government’s
expenditure, the utility diﬀerence, u(ch)u(cl) and thus the marginal beneﬁt is also
higher than in the benevolent government’s case.
Does higher marginal cost and beneﬁt in educating native households also result
in a lower investment in human capital compared to the benevolent government’s
case? To gain some ﬁrst insight, note that investment in human capital of nati-
ve households will be ineﬃciently low, if the welfare function is characterized by
inequality aversion, described by a strictly concave utility function, as in the ca-
se of a benevolent government.27 But, since for a given number of skilled natives,
the diﬀerence in net incomes of skilled and unskilled households is larger under the
partly–selﬁsh policy regime than in the benevolent government’s case due to the
27It is obvious that partly selﬁsh politicians would restrict the access to the public education
system in an eﬃcient way if the utility function is linear, c.f. footnote 25.
13additional burden of ﬁnancing government’s wasteful consumption, the sacriﬁce in
eﬃciency of human capital investment may be also higher to reduce income inequa-
lity. Hence, in general, partly selﬁsh politicians will invest less in education than a
benevolent government. In order to derive this formally, we use (24) together with
(22) to express Nh as an implicit function of Z:


















where the private budget constraints (1) and (17) have been inserted. Recall that in
a small open economy Fh as well as Fl are taken as given. Now, using the implicit







revealing that the number of skilled native households is decreasing with increasing
wasteful expenditures by politicians. To summarize, we have the following
Proposition 2: In a small open economy with perfectly mobile skilled households
politicians abstain from taxing mobile households shifting the whole tax burden on
unskilled native workers. This results in an unequal net income distribution by ma-
king unskilled workers worse oﬀ than skilled workers. Thus, the government has to
restrict the access to the education system. If the government is inequality averse,
public education results in an ineﬃcient low investment in human capital. Compa-
red to a benevolent regime, a partly self–interested government restricts the access
to public education even more.
4 Education policy with mobile unskilled labor
While the link between education and migration propensity is a well–established
empirical result, the public and political debate often stresses that the bulk of mo-
bile households are unskilled workers. Especially, following the discussion on EU
enlargement to the East or establishing NAFTA between US and Mexico, it has be-
14en argued that mainly unskilled households migrate towards the EU and US driven
mostly by income diﬀerentials between countries or regions.
In order to analyze this scenario, consider a small open economy taking the net
return of perfectly mobile unskilled workers as exogenously given,
cl = Fl  tl = !l: (27)
Now, the number of unskilled workers Ll is not determined by the number of un-
skilled natives, Nl = N  Nh, but the number of skilled workers, Lh = Nh. As in
the previous section, employers as well as government do not discriminate against
immigrating unskilled workers. Hence, they receive the same gross wage Fl and pay
the same tax tl.
4.1 Benevolent government’s policy
If the government maximizes the utilitarian welfare function (6) subject to its budget
constraint (7), taking into account the private budget constraints (1), (3), (27), and
the fact that it cannot inﬂuence the net return of mobile unskilled labor, the ﬁrst
order conditions are given by28
tl = 0; and th = e; (28)
ch = cl: (29)
If unskilled workers are perfectly mobile the government taxes only immobile skilled
households, as reﬂected by condition (28). Thus, skilled workers bear their own
education costs. Furthermore, as is shown by (29), the government does not restrict
the access to public education guaranteeing the same net income for skilled and
unskilled households. Using (28) and the private budget constraints in (29) reveals,
that this policy also ensures an eﬃcient human capital investment, Fh  e = Fl.29
28An explicit solution is shown in the Appendix 5.
29It is worth noting, that this policy is also optimal, if the government is only interested in
the welfare of their native skilled households, because it maximizes the net income of immobile
households.
154.2 Partly selﬁsh government’s policy
Finally, we take a look on the optimal education policy of partly self–interested
politicians in the case of perfectly mobile unskilled households. The government
maximizes (12) subject to its budget constraint (11), the private budget constraints,
taking into account that the net return on mobile households are exogenously given
from the government’s perspective. Solving the government’s problem yields the
following ﬁrst order conditions:30












Not astonishingly, according to (30) a partly selﬁsh government also resigns to tax
mobile workers. Thus, skilled immobile households have to fully ﬁnance their edu-
cation as well as government’s wasteful expenditure. Condition (31) describes that
the government will increase its wasteful consumption until the marginal beneﬁt
V 0(Z) is equal to the marginal costs. Since utility of unskilled households are taken
as given, marginal costs are characterized by the decrease of the utility level of a
skilled household u0(ch).
Finally, condition (32) reveals, that partly selﬁsh politicians would like to make
skilled households worse oﬀ than unskilled workers in order to broaden the tax base
ﬁnancing education and government’s wasteful expenditures.31 But, according to
(2), the government can never force households to acquire skills if they may be
worse oﬀ by this. Since this constraint is binding, the best the government can do
is not to restrict the access to the public education system guaranteeing the same
consumption level for all households,
ch = cl: (33)
30Appendix 6 presents an explicit solution.
31Now, the left hand side of (32) denotes the marginal (welfare) costs of educating one additional
household reducing her utility by the amount of u(cl)u(ch), whereas the right hand side represents
the marginal beneﬁt of an additional taxpayer from the government’s point of view.
16Inserting the private budget constraints into (33) and using (30) we get
Fh  th = Fl =) Fh  e > Fl: (34)
Hence, as long as politicians use some tax revenues for their own purposes,
government’s policy has to ensure that gross income of skilled households must
exceed marginal productivity of unskilled labor by more than education costs. This
behavior results in an ineﬃcient low level of investment in human capital, and we get
Proposition 3: In a small open economy with perfectly mobile unskilled house-
holds politicians abstain from taxing mobile households, shifting the whole tax burden
on skilled native workers. Government never restricts the access to the education sy-
stem and all households receive the same net income. In contrast to the benevolent
government’s case, partly selﬁsh politicians cause an ineﬃciently low investment in
human capital.
5 Concluding remarks
Politicians as well as economists are aware of two major insights. First, education
of citizens may be essential to foster national income and growth. Second, due to
economic integration and increasing factor mobility, tax bases become less availa-
ble to ﬁnance public expenditures. This paper deals with both topics using a very
simpliﬁed and stylized model building on Wildasin’s work (2000b) and presents so-
me basic insights one may learn about education policy in the presence of mobile
households. A ﬁrst lesson is that economic integration of labor markets drives go-
vernments to abstain from taxing mobile factors but shifts the whole burden to the
immobile workers. In the case of mobile skilled workers , this results in higher net
incomes for skilled workers. Furthermore, if politicians are inequality averse, the le-
vel of investment in human capital is ineﬃciently low. This is even more pronounced
when politicians are partly self–interested and capture some of the tax revenues for
own purposes.
In contrast, if markets for unskilled labor are integrated the net incomes of hou-
seholds will be equalized. Furthermore, a benevolent government faces the right
17incentives to choose an eﬃcient level of human capital investment. Partly selﬁsh
politicians, however, invest too little in educating their citizens. In order to use so-
me resources for their own consumption, they have to guarantee that the marginal
productivity of skilled labor exceeds that of unskilled workers by more than the
education costs.
Of course, there are many ways the simple analysis in this paper may be expan-
ded. Since human capital is one of the major forces driving economic growth, it
seems of particular interest to incorporate the above mentioned ideas in an explicit-
ly dynamic framework to investigate the impact of public education policy on the
growth path.32 Furthermore, while in the present paper labor markets are assumed
to be perfectly competitive, it seems to be worthwhile to investigate education po-
licy in the presence of labor market imperfections. Following the contributions by
Fuest and Huber (1999), Richter and Schneider (2001), or Koskela and Sch¨ ob (2002)
dealing with optimal factor taxation in the presence of unemployment and mobi-
le capital, it may be expected, that mobile workers should be taxed reducing the
burden for immobile households and turning the conventional wisdom that mobile
factors should not be taxed on its head.33 The question how education policy may
be aﬀected remains open.
32There exists already an increasing literature on education policies and growth, e.g. summarized
by Aghion and Howitt (1998), but most of them neglecting mobility of human capital across
economies.
33See also Fuest and Thum (2001) for a similar discussion. However, in contrast to the pre-
sent paper, they only analyze the case of privately ﬁnanced education and immigration which is
exogenously given.
186 Appendix
Appendix 1. Derivation of (8) and (9)
Using (4), and the private budget constraints (1), the benevolent government’s
problem in the close economy gives the Lagrangean
L = Nhu(Fh  th) + (N  Nh)u(Fl  tl) + [Nhth + (N  Nh)tl  Nhe]:
Maximizing with respect to th, tl, and Nh gives the ﬁrst–order conditions
@L
@th
= 0 ) u
0(ch) = ; (A.1)
@L
@tl
= 0 ) u
0(cl) = ; (A.2)
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@Nh









+ (th  tl  e) = 0:
From (A.1) and (A.2) it follows immediately that ch = cl and, therefore, (8) in the
case of identical utility functions. Using this result and the property of a linear–
homogeneous production function, i.e.









(A.3) becomes th e = tl. Inserting this in the budget constraint of the government
(7) gives condition (9).
Appendix 2. Derivation of (13)–(15)
With partly selﬁsh politicians the government’s problem may be described by
solving the Lagrangean
L = Nhu(Fh  th) + (N  Nh)u(Fl  tl) + V (Z) + [Nhth + (N  Nh)tl  Nhe  Z]
by choosing th, tl, Z, and Nh yielding
@L
@th
= 0 ) u
0(ch) = ; (A.5)
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+ (th  tl  e) = 0:
As in the benevolent government’s case, (A.5) and (A.6) reveal immediately that
ch = cl and thus condition (13). Furthermore, inserting (A.7) in (A.5) and (A.6)
gives condition (14). Finally, using the property of a linear–homogenous production
function (A.4), (A.8) yields th = tl + e. Inserting this into the budget constraint of
a partly selﬁsh government (11) gives the optimal taxes (15).
Appendix 3. Derivation of (19) and (20)
In the case of perfectly mobile skilled labor the benevolent government maximizes
the Lagrangean
L = Nhu(!h) + (N  Nh)u(Fl  tl) + [Lhth + (N  Nh)tl  Nhe]:















= 0 ) u
0(cl) = ; (A.10)
@L
@Nh
= u(ch)  u(cl)  (tl + e) = 0: (A.11)
Since Nl = Ll, the property of the production function (A.4) becomes dFl=dLh =





Since dLh=dth < 0 and  > 0, th = 0. Inserting this into the budget constraint of
the benevolent government (7) yields tl = Nhe=Nl and thus (19). Finally, using
20(A.10) in (A.11) gives immediately (20).
Appendix 4. Derivation of (22)–(24)
With partly selﬁsh politicians the government’s problem may be described by
solving the Lagrangean
L = Nhu(!h) + (N  Nh)u(Fl  tl) + V (Z) + [Nhth + (N  Nh)tl  Nhe  Z]
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0(cl) = ; (A.13)
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@Z
= 0 ) V
0(Z) = ; (A.14)
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@Nh
= u(ch)  u(cl)  (tl + e) = 0: (A.15)
Analogous to the benevolent government’s case, (A.12) reveals that th = 0. Inserting
this into (11) yields tl = (Nhe + Z)=Nl, and hence result (22) in the main text.
From (A.13) and (A.14) we get immediately condition (23). Finally, using (A.13)
in (A.14) gives (24).
Appendix 5. Derivation of (28) and (29)
In the case of perfectly mobile unskilled labor, the benevolent government maxi-
mizes the Lagrangean
L = Nhu(!h) + (N  Nh)u(Fl  tl) + [Lhth + (N  Nh)tl  Nhe]:
by choosing th, tl, and Nh yielding the ﬁrst–order conditions
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@th
= 0 ) u















= u(ch)  u(cl)  (th  e) = 0: (A.18)






Since  > 0 and dLl=dtl < 0, tl = 0. Inserting this into the government’s budget
constraint (7), yields th = e and thus condition (28). Using this result in (A.18)
reveals that u(ch) = u(cl) and thus condition (29).
Appendix 6. Derivation of (30)–(32)
With partly selﬁsh politicians and perfectly mobile unskilled labor, the govern-
ment’s problem is to maximize
L = Nhu(!h) + (N  Nh)u(Fl  tl) + V (Z) + [Nhth + (N  Nh)tl  Nhe  Z]
by choosing th, tl, Z, and Nh yielding the ﬁrst order conditions
@L
@th
= 0 ) u















= 0 ) V
0(Z) = ; (A.21)
@L
@Nh
= u(ch)  u(cl)  (th  e) = 0: (A.22)
Analogous to the benevolent government’s case, (A.20) reveals that tl = 0. Inserting
this into (11) yields th = e + Z=Nh, and hence result (30) in the main text.
From (A.19) and (A.21) we get immediately condition (31). Finally, using (A.21)
and (30) in (A.22) gives (32).
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